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THE INTERPRETIVE VOICE
Ellen P. Aprill*
Theories of statutory interpretation usually focus on the "what"
of statutory interpretation-whether it should be, for example,
Equally important,
textual, dynamic, purposive, or pragmatic.'
however, is the choice of interpreter-the "who" of statutory
interpretation. As Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule recently
urged, theories of statutory interpretation need to spotlight the
institutional capacities of legal interpreters rather than overlook
them: "[D]ebates over legal interpretation cannot be sensibly
resolved without attention to those capacities. The central question
is not 'how, in principle, should a text be interpreted?' The question
their distinctive
instead is 'how should certain institutions, with
2
abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts?"'
In our modem administrative state, Congress writes federal
statutes and the other branches of government share responsibility
for interpreting them. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence,
sometimes courts assume primary interpretive authority; at other
times, that task falls to the executive branch in the form of an
administrative agency.
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,3 the
Supreme Court established the now-famous two-step analysis for
* Ellen P. Aprill is Associate Dean for Academic Programs and the John
E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. She
thanks Michael Asimow, Linda Galler, Beth Garrett, Kristin Hickman,
Katherine Pratt, and Gregg Polsky for their extraordinarily helpful and
skeptical comments on an earlier draft of this piece as well as Steven Bank and

Kirk Stark for the opportunity to present it at the UCLA Tax Policy and Public
Finance Colloquium.
1. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2000) (providing description and discussion of

theories of statutory interpretation).
2. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 886 (2003).

3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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assigning interpretive responsibility. In what became known as
"Chevron's Step One," the Court declared courts need not give
deference to administrative agencies' interpretations when "Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue" because, in such
cases "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. ' 4 If, however, the
"statute is silent or ambiguous," Chevron instructs courts to defer to
the agency so long as "the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."5 Under "Chevron 's Step Two," when
voice
the Congressional voice is unsung or unclear, the interpretive
6
court.
the
not
agency,
administrative
the
of
that
be
is to
Over time, the reach of Chevron's holding seemed to grow. A
variety of decisions gave Chevron's Step Two deference to
interpretations developed through informal agency decisionmakin
procedures such as policy statements, manuals, and opinion letters.
United States v. Mead Corp.,8 however, cut back on the reach of
Chevron Step Two 9 and gave renewed prominence to the tests of
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 10 Under Skidmore, while the degree of
deference given by a court to an administrative interpretation varies
based on a number of factors, final interpretive authority rests with
the court."1 Thus, Skidmore's interpretive voice is ultimately a
4. Id. at 842-43.
5. Id. at 843.
6. See id. at 843-44 (stating legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute").
7. See Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449,
452-53 (1999) (Chevron deference to Medicare manual); NationsBank of N.C.
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (Chevron
deference to Comptroller of the Currency opinion letter); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (some, but not complete, Chevron
deference to EEOC guidelines); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 642, 647-48 (1990) (Chevron deference to agency opinion
letters); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978-80 (1986)
(Chevron deference

to no-action

decision of the Food

and Drug

Administration).
8. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
9. Id. at 225-31.
10. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
11. Id. at 139-40. Renewed reliance on Skidmore was foreshadowed in
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (stating that no
Chevron deference will be given to agency opinion letter).
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judicial one. The reasoning of Mead can be expected to amplify the
judicial voice further by reducing the influence of Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 12 and Auer v. Robbins,13 which held that
courts should defer to administrative interpretations of an agency's
own regulations. 14
The discussion that follows adopts the approach of Neil
Komesar by focusing on comparative institutional competency and
institutional choice.' The article addresses these questions in terms
of "interpretive voice" because it considers not only the abilities and
limitations of courts and administrative agencies, but also how both
of these institutions express their conclusions; that is, the relationship
between what they do and what they say they do. Who has primary
authority to interpret the law can affect the substantive law itself.
Because of their different institutional capacities and different
roles, these interpreters in our constitutional system have very
different points of view and thus produce very different interpretive
voices. Courts review administrative interpretations only sporadically and, when they do, they have a duty to limit their rulings to
the isolated context of a particular case. Administrative agencies
make interpretive decisions based on a broad range of policy
considerations within the context of the entire range of their
administrative responsibilities. Requiring agencies to justify interpretive decisions from the judicial point of view risks distorting
administrative decisionmaking, not only by diverting precious
resources, but also by decreasing administrative freedom to make
necessary tradeoffs regarding such matters as policy priorities and
enforcement capability.
This article explores these issues using examples from tax law.
It does so for several reasons. Consideration of administrative law
doctrines should include consideration of tax law. As the Supreme
Court observed in Dobson v. Commissioner, "[n]o other branch of
12. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
13. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).

14. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; Auer, 519 U.S. at 457, 462.
15. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMIC, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (providing a

strategy for comparative institutional analysis that assesses variations in
institutional abilities by identifying social goals, and determining which
institution-the market, political process, or adjudicative process-is best
equipped to implement those social goals).
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the law touches human activities at so many points."' 6 In addition,
tax law exposes certain aspects of administrative law particularly
well. For example, tax has a certain legal purity. With the exception
of some environmental taxes, tax law seldom involves questions at
the frontier of science that can complicate consideration of action by
administrative agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or Occupational Safety and Housing Administration
(OSHA). Interpretations of tax law by the Treasury Department and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are subject to review by both
generalist and specialist federal courts. Thus, tax law provides a
useful set of cases for exploring whether interpretive authority
should rest with courts or administrative agencies. 17
Part I of this article describes the interpretive voices of courts
and agencies. Part II demonstrates the reach of Chevron's Step One
by contrasting the trial court's opinions in a tax case with the
appellate court decision. Part III considers the impact of Mead on
Chevron's Step Two and on the resulting resurgence of Skidmore.
Part IV discusses Mead's effect on Seminole Rock and Auer. Finally,
Part V revisits Skidmore. The article concludes that courts, like most
of us, are most comfortable when they hear their own accents.
Indeed, the administrative interpretive voice may be so different
from the judicial one that each has difficulty in understanding the
subtleties of the other.
Using the metaphor of the interpretive voice and examples from
tax law, this article demonstrates how Mead, while purporting to
clarify Chevron, in fact moves away from its core principles. Mead
expands the judicial interpretive voice by putting additional pressure
on administrative agencies to imitate the judicial interpretive voice. 18
16. 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943).
17. Focus on tax in this piece is personal as well as practical, as tax is the
area of law I know best.
18. One scholar recently wrote: "As Peter Strauss, Todd Rakoff, and
Cynthia Farina have suggested, courts expand the adjudicatory implications of
the... [Administrative Procedure Act] because of their own familiarity with
the adjudicatory process. The result is that rulemaking, although conceived as
agency legislation, has been subjected to requirements that are largely judicial
in nature." Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the Administrative Procedure
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95, 111-12 (2003) (citing PETER
STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND

510-15, 549 (10th ed. 2003). Rubin believes "[f]urther judicial
resistance to the APA's apparent analogy between legislation and rulemaking
COMMENTS
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Because I fear that intensive judicial review leads to judicial
micromanagement of agency decisions and ossification of the noticeand-comment rulemaking process, 19 1regret this result.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE VOICES OF COURTS AND OF AGENCIES
Institutional differences between courts and administrative
agencies produce different interpretive voices. As Chevron itself
recognizes, administrative agencies are politically accountable in
ways that courts are not:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally
left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
20
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
In Chevron this democratic pedigree justifies deference by the
courts to policy decisions made by administrative agencies regarding
matters left open by Congress. 2 1 Of course, political accountability
also means that administrative agencies are subject to political
considerations. Not only do political pressures on the President
influence administrative agencies, 22 administrative agencies also are
is provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

NRDC ....[T]he Chevron Court, in its effort to fashion a standard of review
for statutory interpretation in agency rulemaking, turned to the judicial

model.... ." Id. at 140-142 (footnote omitted). Rubin's article seeks to
demonstrate the extent to which United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001), has exacerbated imposition of the judicial, rather than legislative,
model on agency rulemaking.

19. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 528, 545

(2003). Arguments against intensive judicial review include its being too
burdensome and unpredictable, that it causes agencies to devote too much time
and effort to insulating rules from reversal, and that it displaces appropriate
political judgments. See id. at 484 n.109 (listing and summarizing positions
regarding the ossification debate); see infra Part V; see also sources cited infra
notes 183, 209 (providing additional sources discussing the ossification
debate).
20. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).

21. See id.

22. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv.
2245, 2335-36 (2001) (describing the influence of the President on individual
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subject to Congressional oversight and pressures through hearings,
investigations, budget, reviews, and legislative sanctions. 23 As Peter
Strauss has argued, one consequence of this relationship with
attend to legislative
Congress is that, as a practical matter, agencies
24
language.
statutory
interpreting
history in
Administrative agencies specialize in the statutes they
administer; they have technical competence and expertise. Administrative agencies interpret individual statutory provisions in light of
the entire statutory scheme entrusted to it and with awareness of all
parties affected by their interpretation, some of whom have
competing or even contradictory concerns. Agencies must continually reconcile and accommodate a myriad of competing interests,
including whether a particular interpretation would be feasible to
administer. Agencies' understanding of the statutory scheme is both
broad and deep, and they must be active rather than reactive in
administering it. "[A]gencies essentially live the process of statutory
interpretation[.],, 25 They must consider whether an interpretation of
a provision is administrable by considering its impact on other
aspects of the agency's responsibilities including the resources
available for enforcement, the impact of compliance, including the
burden of compliance on those affected by the interpretation. The
agency must also assess a particular interpretation's impact on
available human and financial resources as well as its impact on
enforcement of other statutory provisions under its aegis.
Not only do administrative interpretations reflect all these
pressures, they also generally arise from a bureaucratic and
hierarchical process that involves many individuals, including
interested parties from outside the agency. There is seldom a single

regulatory issues).
23. See U.S. S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. II: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES,

S. DOc No. 95-26, at ix-x (1st Sess. 1977) (recommending ways to enhance

systematic congressional review of regulatory agencies).
24. See Peter Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 329-30 (1990) (describing the importance
of legislative history to agency decisionmaking).
25. Id. at 329.

26. See id. at 327-29 (describing various factors that influence agencies'
interpretation of statutes).
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author responsible for an administrative interpretation's language.
To the extent that agencies engage in formal or informal rulemaking
rather than adjudication, they often issue interpretations ex ante with
the intent
of influencing future events rather than responding to past
7
ones.

2

Students of bureaucracies warn about some aspects of the
administrative voice. Administrative agencies risk capture by the
interest groups they regulate; the administrative voice may become a
ventriloquist for private interest groups. Administrative agencies,
acting out of their own self-interest, will tend to increase their power
and prestige by claiming regulatory authority over as broad an area
28
as possible.
Courts interpret statutes in a very different context. Article III
judges are generalists, not specialists. Because they hold lifetime
appointments, Article III judges are largely shielded from political
and policy considerations.
Moreover, judicial encounters with
statutory interpretation are unpredictable, episodic, and ex post; the
court's responsibility is only to the parties and the particular question
in the concrete case before it. Further, judges do not have as their
primary duty the administration of a particular statutory scheme.
Thus, considerations about the administrability or practical effects an
interpretation will impose on the system, individual citizens, and
other provisions of the statutory scheme are not salient to courts.
Although political insulation has traditionally produced an
image of courts as disinterested, recent scholarship has pointed out
29
how courts are also subject to interest group influence.
27. See id. at 346 (noting the difference between agencies' rational,
proactive approach and courts' episodic, retroactive approach).
28. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967)

(arguing that because bureaucratic officials are significantly motivated by their
own self interests analysts can predict bureaucratic behavior and incorporate
that understanding within a generalized theory of social decisionmaking);
WILLIAM

A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

(1971) (analyzing bureaucratic behavior under economic theories).
29. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the FragileCasefor JudicialReview of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REv. 1249, 1314-22 (1999) [hereinafter Cross,

Shattering] (describing biases that affect the litigation process); Frank B.
Cross, The Judiciaryand Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 360-68 (1999)
(describing how "[c]ourts are simply another venue in which influence may be
brought to bear upon government policy"); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 80-
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Administrative interpretations that burden the wealthier are more
likely to be challenged in court than those that burden the less welloff. Only those that challenge administrative interpretations have the
opportunity to prevail. Assuming that the wealthy will challenge
administrative interpretations more often, and that they will win at
least some of the time, the result of judicial decisions regarding
statutory interpretations may drift toward interpretations favoring the
rich and well-organized. This scholarship suggests that courts too,
can be expected to act in ways that increase their power.
Considerations that do not influence the administrative voice do
influence the judicial voice. As Jerry Mashaw has recently pointed
out,30 Article III courts, unlike administrative agencies, have the
capacity and perhaps the duty to give coherence to the general legal
order, 3 1 including statutory schemes administered by different
Courts, far more than agencies, see upholding the
agencies.
Constitution as one of their primary duties and therefore have a
tendency to interpret to avoid raising Constitutional questions. As a
result, lower courts may be bound by precedent in a way that
agencies are not. Moreover, courts, unlike administrative agencies,
to explain fully the basis for their interpretation in their
are expected
32
opinions.

83 (1991) (noting interest group pressure on judicial appointments); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1055-56
(1995) (describing judicial incentives for decisionmaking in administrative
law).
30. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, 3 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 9 (Nov. 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/iis/iss3/art9/.
31. Mashaw observes, "Guido Calabresi and Ronald Dworkin have, for
instance, suggested that fitting statutory language within the overall
topography of the law is the principal responsibility of courts as independent
interpreters." Id. at 6 (citing GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that courts should enlarge the common law
and be the primary authority for statutory interpretation and revision); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (discussing various theories of how judges
determine what the law is)).
32. As Mashaw observes:
We know the answer to occasion, form and process questions when

considering judicial interpretation of statutes. The occasion is a
lawsuit. The form of interpretation is a judicial opinion rationalizing
the court's resolution of the lawsuit. The process is the conventional
judicial process of adversary argument followed by independent
judicial consideration.
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In the case of tax, citizens can choose to litigate in a generalist
Article III court, a specialist Article III court, or a specialist Article I
court, namely, a United States District Court, the United States Court
33
of Federal Claims, and the United States Tax Court, respectively.
Decisions of the United States Court of Federal Claims are
reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; decisions
of the Tax Court and the district courts are reviewable by the federal
court of appeals for the circuit in which the taxpayer resides.34 Only
for suits in the Tax Court may a taxpayer litigate without first paying
the tax,35 and most tax cases begin in the Tax Court.3 6
Specialized courts, such as the Tax Court, have characteristics of
both Article III courts and administrative agencies and thus are good
testing grounds for the reach and doctrinal underpinning judicial
deference rules such as those in Mead. Although the nineteen Tax
Court judges do not hold lifetime appointments, their fifteen-year
terms insulate them considerably from politics. 37 Like other courts,
their encounters with administrative interpretations are sporadic and
dependent on issues the parties bring to them. While Tax Court
judges may consider the impact of a particular interpretation on other
provisions of the Code, they, like generalist judges, must focus on
the dispute before them. Moreover, the administrability of a
particular position is not a key concern to Tax Court judges. Tax
Court judges, however, do not necessarily consider salient
constitutional issues or strive for general legal coherence. 38 In these
Id. at 18.
33. See I.R.C. § 6213 (West 2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1)
(2000).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2000); I.R.C. § 7482(b) (West 2003).
35. See I.R.C. § 6213 (West 2003).
36. The Tax Court hears the vast majority of tax cases. See INTERNAL
REvENUE SERv., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK

2003, Table 29

Chief Counsel Workload: Tax Litigation, by Type of Case 37 (2003). For
history of the Tax Court, see Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An
Historical Analysis, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7 (1975). There is a large body of
scholarship considering the role of specialized courts more generally. See,
e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.

REV. 329 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990
BYU L. REV. 377; Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
37. See I.R.C. § 7443(e) (West 2003).
38. For example, in a recent case involving the exclusion from income for
the value of housing provided a "minister of the Gospel" by I.R.C. section 107,
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regards, the Tax Court resembles an administrative agency.
The institutional capacities of different legal interpreters affect
how each one views and decides questions of statutory interpretation.
Institutional capacities affect not only how each goes about the task,
but also how they describe and explain their conclusions.
Significantly, these institutional capacities also affect the extent to
which each is able to understand the approach and concerns of the
other interpreter. Institutional capacities frame and therefore limit
understanding.
II. CHEVRON STEP ONE

Mead addresses only Chevron's Step Two and leaves in place
the judicial voice of Chevron's Step One. Step One, however, is
important to assessing the impact of Mead. Step One applies when
"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue"
because when "the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 39 Under Step One, a
court does not defer to or even consider the administrative
interpretive voice. Since Chevron reads statutory ambiguity or
silence as an implicit delegation to the administrative agency, it
follows that there is no such delegation when there is sufficient
clarity as to Congressional intent. Since administrative preferences
are not taken into account, decisions under Step One of Chevron are
made without considerations of administrative expertise, whether in
the form of knowledge of the statute, administrability of a rule, or
technical knowledge.
The Step One language referring to clear congressional intent
suggests that under Step One there is, in fact, no interpretive voice.
Other language in Chevron along with actual judicial practice,
however, shows that such is not the case; Step One of Chevron paves
the way for a judicial interpretive voice. Chevron itself explained:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions
the Ninth Circuit raised the constitutional issue of the Establishment Clause
while the Tax Court did not. Compare Warren v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th
Cir. 2002) (raising the constitutional issue), with Warren v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
343 (2000) (ignoring the constitutional issue).
39. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
40
effect.
As Beth Garrett explains, traditional tools of statutory
construction include more than the statutory language; they
encompass statutory context, structure, framework, purpose, and, for
various courts and judges, dictionary definitions, canons of statutory
construction, and legislative history. 4 1 These are judicial tools; their
use in determining that Step One of Chevron applies in a given
situation gives rise to the judicial interpretive voice.
Indeed, judicial decisions analyzing administrative action under
Step One generally invalidate administrative interpretations; they
represent a rejection of the administrative voice in which policy
considerations play an important role. A Step One decision is a
judicial decision that the agency's interpretation, while not
unreasonable, goes beyond "the acceptable parameters of possible
statutory meaning ... ,,42 A pair of recent tax opinions illustrates
this dynamic. The lower court upheld an administrative interpretation only to have the appellate court invalidate the interpretation by
relying on what it characterized as clear congressional direction. In
Tax Analysts v. IRS,43 a non-profit publisher of tax news and
commentary sought disclosure of IRS documents denying or
revoking tax-exempt status. The IRS denied the request, relying on
regulation section 301.6110-1 (a),' which states that revocations and
denials of tax-exempt status are not available for inspection under
either sections 6110 or 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
require disclosure of certain IRS determinations.45
40. Id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
41. Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council 2001 ABA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE 2-6 (3d
draft), at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevron-revised3.doc.

42. Id. at 18, at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevron-revised_3.
doc.
43. 215 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 350 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir.

2003).
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1(a) (2004).
45. I.R.C. section 6110(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this
section, the text of any written determination and any background file
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The district court granted the IRS's motion for summary
judgment. It first categorized such denials and revocations as "return
information" under section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code 46 and
thus not subject to disclosure. 47 It relied on case law to define
"return" under section 6103 as factual information necessary to
determine federal tax liability of a taxpayer-specific nature. 48 It
found that the revocations and denials were not "written
determinations" requiring disclosure under section 6110.4 9 It
reasoned that Congress did not specify what types of rulings or
determination letters constituted "written determinations" under
section 6110. The statutory language was therefore ambiguous;
Mead and Chevron obligated the court to defer to the IRS's
reasonable regulation promulgated after notice and comment. 50 The
district court concluded that the regulation was a reasonable
interpretation of section 6104, which required disclosure only for
thus left a gap
organizations that are granted tax-exempt status5 and
1
exemption.
tax
of
denials
of
regarding disclosure
For the court of appeals, in contrast, the case clearly fell under
Step One of Chevron, requiring "traditional tools of statutory
interpretation-text, structure, purpose, and legislative history." 52 It
found nothing ambiguous in the text of section 6110, which requires
53
disclosure of redacted versions of "written determinations."
Resolution of the case turned on the application of section 6104's
document relating to such written determination shall be open to public
inspection at such place as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe." I.R.C.
§ 6110(a) (West 2003). Section 6110(l)(1), however, provides that this
disclosure rule does not apply to "any matter to which section 6104...
applies . .

. ."

Id. § 61 10(l)(1).

Section 6104(a)(1)(A) states: "If an

organization... is exempt from taxation... the application filed by the
organization.., together with any papers submitted in support of such
application or notice.., shall be open to public inspection...." I.R.C.
§ 6104(a)(1)(A) (West 2003).
46. Section 6103(a) provides in pertinent part, "Returns and return
information shall be confidential." I.R.C. § 6103(a) (West 2003).
47. Tax Analysts, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 198.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Tax Analysts, 350 F.3d at 103 (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
53. Id.
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exceptions to the disclosure requirements of section 6110.
According to the court, section 6104(a)(1)(A), on which the IRS
relied, is limited to exempt organizations; it "says nothing about
documents relating to non-exempt organizations." 54 Moreover, the
court explained, section 6104(a)(1)(B), which applies to any
"application" regarding tax exemption for certain pension,
retirement, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans, demonstrates that
Congress knew "exactly how to refer to denials and revocations
when it so intended."" So clear was the statute's language that the
56
court concluded that it had "no need to resort to legislative history."
The court nonetheless observed that its interpretation advanced the
purpose of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to57 disclose written
determinations while protecting taxpayer privacy.
The court of appeals thought there was no question that
Congress had indicated its clear intent on the issue, although neither
the IRS nor the district court had been able to discern this clarity.
The court of appeals preferred the judicial point of view to that of the
administrative agency. In this case, the court of appeals perhaps
burden of disclosure
feared that a desire to resist the administrative
58
view.
of
point
administrative
the
colored
This pair of opinions highlights the difficulty of reconciling
Chevron's two steps. Chevron states that "if the statute is silent or
ambiguous... the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 59 The
district court found the statutory scheme silent as to the treatment of
revocations or denials of tax-exempt status; the court of appeals read
the statute as addressing the question through its interpretation of
"written determination."
Professor Levin has observed that when the Supreme Court,
"utilizes the Chevron framework, it either upholds the agency or
reverses on the strength of step one." 60 This observation is true of
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id.
58. See William A. Dobrivir, Anatomy of a Regulation: How Far the IRS
Will Go to Hide Its Law, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 30, 2004, at 1669,
available at LEXIS, 2004 TNT 61-39.

59. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
60. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,72
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other courts as well. What this article suggests is that the choice
between Chevron's Step One and Step Two is in good measure a
choice between the judicial and administrative voices. Statutory
language challenged in court is seldom if ever pellucid. As Tax
Analysts demonstrates, statutory language can relatively easily be
characterized as clear or as ambiguous; much depends on which and
how many of the tools of traditional statutory construction a court
chooses to deploy at Step One, 6 1 a decision within the control of the
court.
Since it is up to a court to determine whether a decision is under
Step One or Step Two, Chevron has not undermined the directive of
Marbury that it is "the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." 62 As Jonathan Molot wrote, "outcomes at
Chevron Step I are not all pre-ordained by Congress .... Whether a
statute is clear or ambiguous at Step I itself is often an important
interpretive question-a question which judges have reserved for
themselves." 3 At times it may seem that the judiciary has not
simply reserved this question, but has in fact appropriated it. As
Professor Mashaw concluded after a recent study of the EPA and
Health and Human Services (HHS):
Perhaps most striking are the cases in which an agency's
highly nuanced interpretation-based on text, legislative
history, statutory history, past agency practice, the balance
of competing congressional purposes, and industry or
scientific understandings-were rejected in favor of judicial
approaches based on pure textual analysis,
plain meaning or
64
the invocation of grammatical rules.
The choice between Step One and Step Two is a choice by a
L. REv. 1253, 1261 (1997). But see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999) (invalidating agency action as unreasonable and thus
implicitly invalid under Step Two of Chevron).
61. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
InterpretationsofLaw, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989).
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
63. Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
CHI.-KENT

Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory

Interpretation,96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1239, 1267 (2002).
64. Mashaw, supra note 30, at 26, at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article= 1028&context--ils.
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court whether to hear the particular accents of the administrative
voice.
III. CHEVRON' S STEP TWO AFTER MEAD

If a court reaches Step Two of Chevron, however, the result is
very different. The administrative voice is likely to prevail: "[O]nce
a reviewing court reaches the second step of this framework, the
agency interpretation of the statute is usually sustained, often in a
perfunctory way.",65 There is little question under Step Two of
Chevron as to the nature of the interpretive voice. Moreover,
because Chevron's Step Two is based on an implied congressional
delegation and sounds in notions of constitutional structure and
accountability rather than expertise, it follows that even specialized
courts such as the Tax Court are to defer to the administrative agency
under Chevron's Step Two. In United States v. Haggar Apparel
Co.,66 the Supreme Court required the Court of International Trade to
give regulations "Chevron deference," where appropriate. 67 For the
Supreme Court, the expertise of the Court of International Trade did
not eliminate the need for the Court of International Trade to defer to
the administrative agency; expertise instead made the Court expert in
applying Chevron.68
Uncertainty about Chevron deference in the case of informal
65. M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 2001 A.B.A. ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 2 (4th draft), at
She also observes that
www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/abachevronl.doc.
Chevron's Step Two "is a strong rule of deference-a rule meaning that the

agency will nearly always be sustained." Id. at 10.
66. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
67. Id. at 394.
68. The Court observed, "The expertise of the Court of International Trade,
somewhat like the expertise of the Tax Court, guides it in making complex
determinations in a specialized area of the law; it is well positioned to evaluate
customs regulations and their operation in light of the statutory mandate to
determine if the preconditions for Chevron deference are present." Id. This
language, however, could be read as encouraging specialized courts to make
decisions under Chevron's Step One rather than Step Two and in that way
decreasing the need for the specialized court to defer to the administrative
agency. Whether specialized courts have favored Chevron's Step One more
than generalist courts would be an interesting topic for further study. Cf
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 922-23 (suggesting need for study of
interpretive techniques of specialized courts where decisions are reviewed by
generalist courts).
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interpretations triggered Mead. The rule announced in Mead,
however, introduces considerable uncertainty about when an
administrative interpretation falls under Step Two. Mead purported
to lay down ground rules for application of Step Two that go beyond
the presence of a statutory ambiguity or gap: "administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority." 69 This additional criterion clearly
limits the administrative voice. The opinion continues, "Delegation
of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent." 70 Mead, however, does not define or describe
these other indications and thus does not establish any bright-line
rule for applying Chevron's Step Two.
Judicial interpretations of tax regulations promulgated under the
authority of section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
demonstrate the difficulty in applying this rule of Mead regarding
Chevron's Step Two and how Mead can be read as limiting the
administrative interpretive voice. 71 Section 7805(a) provides that the
69. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001).
70. Id. at 227.
71. Determining judicial standards for the validity of tax regulations is
further complicated by the fact that both before and after Chevron, the
Supreme Court and lower courts reviewing tax regulations often relied on the
test announced in NationalMuffler Dealer'sAss 'n v. United States. 440 U.S.
472 (1978). This test examined whether the regulation at issue harmonized
with the plain language, origin, and purposes of the statute, the manner in
which the regulation evolved, and the length of time the regulation had been in
effect. Id.; see Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task
Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 759-63 (2004). "The
National Muffler analysis melds aspects of Skidmore and Chevron. Like
Skidmore, it considers many factors, but like Chevron, it evidences a high
degree of deference to administrative decisions.... The relationship between
Chevron and NationalMuffler has long puzzled lower courts." Id. at 760, 763.
I was one of the authors of the Report, and this article draws upon it at various
points, particularly for descriptions of cases, statutes, and regulations. This
article is to a large extent the mirror image of the Task Force Report which
looked at tax law through the lens of Mead. This article, however, looks at
Mead through the lens of tax law.
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Secretary of the Treasury "shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code.72
That is, it grants general authority to the Secretary of the Treasury.
In the tax world, regulations promulgated pursuant to section 7805(a)
are known as interpretive regulations; only regulations promulgated
73
under such specific grants of authority are known as legislative.
The 'Supreme Court has long recognized the distinction tax law
draws between interpretive and legislative regulations. The Supreme
Court wrote in Rowan Cos. v. United States,74 and reiterated in
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,7 5 that when a regulation is

issued under the general authority of section 7805(a), "we owe the
interpretation less deference than a regulation issued under a specific
term or prescribe a method of
grant of authority to define a statutory
76
provision."
statutory
a
executing
In promulgating interpretive regulations, the Treasury and IRS
invariably specify that "section 553(b) of the Administrative
72. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West 2003).
73. In other areas of the law, grants of authority similar to that of section
7805 are deemed to be grants to promulgate rules carrying the force of law.
That is, in other areas of the law, regulations promulgated under grants similar
to that of section 7805(a) would be "legislative" rather than "interpretative"
rules under the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring notice and comment
rulemaking, but valid if such procedures are followed unless found to be
arbitrary and capricious. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S.
380 (1999); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Sullivan v.
Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 467 (2002). Such is not the case for tax law. Tax law reserves the
category "legislative" regulations for regulations promulgated pursuant to
grants of regulatory authority under specific substantive provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. See Salem et al., supra note 71, at 728-29. Examples
of such specific regulatory authority include I.R.C. sections 1502, 337(d), and
469(l). Section 1502, perhaps the most famous legislative delegation,
provides:
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem
necessary in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of
corporations making a consolidated return... in such manner as
clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the various factors
necessary for the determination of such liability, and in order to
prevent avoidance of such tax liability.
I.R.C. § 1502 (West 2003).
74. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
75. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
76. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 253; Vogel, 455 U.S. at 24.
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Procedure Act does not apply to these regulations .... ',7
Section
553(b) requires agencies to follow notice and comment procedures

when they promulgate legislative rules that bind the public. Thus, the
Treasury and IRS could be viewed as taking the position that
regulations issued pursuant to section 7805 are not legislative
regulations that bind the public within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act. At the same time, however, it is the
customary practice of the IRS to follow notice and comment
procedures for interpretive regulations, 78 the very procedure the
Administrative Procedure Act requires for regulations to bind the
public. Moreover, Treasury regulations describe regulations as the
"most important" tax rules without
distinguishing between interpre79

tive and legislative regulations.
The IRS and Treasury deny the applicability of section 553(b) to
interpretive tax regulations, and longstanding authority establishes

that courts owe such regulations less deference than legislative tax

regulations. 8 Thus, some judges and thoughtful commentators have
argued that they do not warrant the strong deference of Chevron's
77. See, e.g., T.D. 9043, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,190, 10,192 (Mar. 4, 2003) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (internal citation omitted). The Internal Revenue
Manual, which comprises the Regulations Drafting Handbook, is consistent on
this point: "5 U.S.C. 553(b) requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking be
published in the Federal Register and that interested persons be given the
opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations before final regulations
are adopted .... However, these requirements do not apply if the rules are
interpretative." INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., INTERNAL REvENUE MANUAL
30(15), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/ch02s04.html.
78. For recent examples, see Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 68
Fed. Reg. 24,898 (May 9, 2003); Proposed Regulations on Changes in
Accounting Method, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,310 (May 12, 2003); Proposed
Regulations on Private Activity Bond Definition, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,845 (May
14, 2003). The IRS at times expands the notice and comment period by
announcing its intent to issue proposed regulations and inviting comments
even before proposed regulations are published. See, e.g., Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Credit for Increasing Research Authority, 69 Fed.
Reg. 43 (Jan. 2, 2004).
79. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a) (2004). For a thoughtful pre-Mead judicial
discussion of the difficulty in determining the degree of judicial deference due
interpretative tax regulations, see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States,
142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998).
80. See Vogel, 455 U.S. at 24 (finding that longstanding authority gives
interpretive regulations less deference than legislative tax regulations); Rowan,
452 U.S. at 253 (same).
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Step Two under Mead's requirement that interpretations be issued
pursuant to a delegation of Congressional authority that has the force
and effect of law to merit Chevron deference. 81 These courts and
commentators argue that regulations promulgated under section 7805
merit only the lesser and uncertain deference of Skidmore, 82 under
which courts retain final interpretive authority and can reject even
reasonable administrative interpretations if judges prefer another
interpretation. Other courts and commentators, however, reach the
opposite conclusion by emphasizing the statement in Mead that
Chevron deference does not require notice and comment
rulemaking.

83

The vast majority of tax regulations rely in whole or in part on
section 7805(a) for their authority. 84 Mead puts into doubt the
degree of deference due such guidance. It is not clear whether these
regulations should receive deference under Chevron or Skidmore.
Tax regulations are promulgated with substantive and procedural
care, with preambles that provide elaborate explanations of the
reasoning behind the regulations in the preamble. 85 Thus, it is likely
that most interpretive tax regulations would be upheld even if a court
Given the
applied Skidmore rather than Chevron deference.
81. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 44, 156-57 (2002) (Vasquez, J.,
dissenting); John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review
of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV.
39 (2003) (agreeing that interpretative regulations are entitled only to Skidmore
deference post-Mead); cf Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax
Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731 (2002) (arguing that while both

interpretive and legislative regulations have been given Chevron deference,
they both should receive the deference they earn under Skidmore).
82. For a detailed discussion of possible meanings of Skidmore deference
see infra Part V.
83. See, e.g., Alfaro v. Comm'r, 349 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2003); Hosp. Corp.
of Am. v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2003); Salem et al., supra note 71,
at 737-38; See also Barhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (finding that Mead
does not require notice and comment for Chevron to apply; Chevron deference
given to interpretation stated in ruling, manual, and letter).
84. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (noting
that the Treasury could have promulgated a regulation addressing the issue in
the case under specific authority but chose instead the general authority of
section 7805 and calling for deference to the general authority regulation); IRS
Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 69 Fed. Reg. 38,029-38,102 (June 28, 2004);
IRS Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 68 Fed. Reg. 73,418-73,487 (Dec. 22,
2003).
85. See Salem et al., supra note 71, at 738-41.
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malleability of results under Skidmore,86 however, it is possible that
at least some interpretative tax regulations could be invalidated under
the factors of Skidmore.
Consider Treasury regulation section 1.701-2, a controversial
partnership anti-abuse regulation. 87 This regulation requires that the
provisions of subchapter K (the subchapter of the Internal Revenue
Code dealing with partnerships) and the regulations thereunder be
applied "in a manner that is consistent with the intent of subchapter
K ' 88 and authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
"recast" any transaction that does not. 89 When this regulation was
first proposed, it raised a storm of protest. One practitioner declared
that the date of the notice of rulemaking was "a day that will live in
infamy. ' 9° Two authors who support the regulation acknowledge
that, "[t]he Treasury's approach was both novel and aggressive. The
Treasury had never been this assertive before, especially in the
absence of a specific legislative mandate." 91 Critics of the
regulation, on the other hand, charge that in the absence of a specific
legislative mandate, the Treasury lacked authority to promulgate
92
general anti-abuse regulations.
The regulation's validity has yet to be tested in court. The
86. See infra text accompanying notes 127-136.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2004).
88. Id. § 1.701-2(b).
89. Id.
90. Douglass J. Antonio et al., Chicago Group Callsfor OMB Investigation
of Treasury's Decision Not to Analyze PartnershipAntiabuse Reg. 's Effect on
Economy, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 1994, at 38, available at LEXIS, 94
TNT 142-38; see Sheldon I. Banoff, Anatomy of an Antiabuse Rule: What's
Really Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, 66 TAX NOTES 1859 (1995); James
A. Gouwar, The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: Treasury
Oversteps Its Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 287, 289-90 (1995);
Richard Lipton, ControversialPartnershipAnti-Abuse Prop. Regs. Raise Many
Questions, 81 J. TAx'N 68 (1994).
91. Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters,
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 34 (2004).
92. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge
PartnershipAnti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, 69 TAX NOTES 1395, 1397-99
(1995) (summarizing letters); Donald C. Alexander et al., Commentators Say
PartnershipAntiabuse Rule Doesn't Satisfy Fundamentalfor a Workable Tax
System, TAX NOTEs TODAY, Sept. 7, 1995, at 28, available at LEXIS, 95 TNT
175-28; Lawrence B. Gibbs et al., PartnershipAntiabuse Rule is Broader than
Necessary Say Miller & Chevalier Attorneys, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 7,
1995, at 27, availableat LEXIS, 95 TNT 175-27.
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outcome of any such test, however, could well turn on whether
courts judge the regulation, an interpretive regulation promulgated
primarily under the authority of section 7805(b), under Chevron or
Skidmore. Supporters of the regulation defend it under Chevron's
Step Two. 93 Should, however, interpretive regulations that the
Treasury and IRS proclaim are not subject to section 553(b) prove to
be entitled only to the lower level of deference possible under
Skidmore, the regulation would be far more vulnerable. Under
Skidmore, judges have ultimate interpretive authority and can
invalidate even reasonable interpretations if they decide a better
approach is possible. 94 Moreover, under Skidmore, the novelty of the
anti-abuse regulations would count against their validity. 95 Thus,
testing interpretive regulations under Skidmore could well render
invalid regulations that would have been upheld under Chevron's
Step Two.
The example of interpretive tax regulations demonstrates the
uncertainty of Chevron's Step Two after Mead. A recent Supreme
Court decision compounds the problem. In Boeing Co. v. United
States,96 the Court ignored both Chevron and Mead, despite the
lower court's reliance on these cases in its opinion, 97 and the
government's reliance on them in its briefs. 98 The Court observed
that the Treasury Department could have promulgated a regulation to
address the issue in the case under the specific authority delegated to
it by section 994, but instead promulgated the regulation under the
general authority of section 7805(a). 99 According to the decision,
93. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 91, at 50-55. Unlike some
commentators and courts, these authors see "no significant difference"
between Chevron and Nat'l Muffler. Id. at 47. See also Rebecca S. Rudnick,
Boston University ProfessorPraisesAntiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, July
19, 1994, at 69, availableat LEXIS, 94 TNT 139-69 (relying on Chevron). Of
course, many who object to the regulation would also find it impermissible
under Step One of Chevron because of the lack of statutory authority and
unreasonableness if tested under Step Two of Chevron. See sources cited supra
note 92.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 164-165.
95. See discussion infra Part V.B.
96. 537 U.S. 437 (2003).
97. Boeing Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir.2001) (relying
on Chevron).
98. Brief for Respondent, Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003)
(Nos. 01-1209, 01-1382).
99. Boeing Co., 537 U.S. at 447-48.
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even if the regulation at issue was "interpretive because it was
promulgated under § 7805(a)'s general rulemaking grant rather than
pursuant to a specific grant of authority," a court "must still treat the
regulation with deference."' 100 The Court concluded that the
taxpayer's "arguments based on statutory text [were] plainly
insufficient to overcome the deference to which the Secretary's
The opinion did not make clear,
interpretation is entitled."''
however, what level of deference the interpretation merited; the
02
Court cited neither Chevron nor Skidmore for this proposition.
Perhaps in this case the regulation would have been upheld under
either set of standards. In other situations, however, the test applied
may well dictate the result. Until case law clarifies the issue, the
uncertainty regarding the level of deference given to interpretive tax
regulations in our post-Mead world remains unresolved.
IV. DEFERENCE UNDER SEMINOLE ROCK AND A UER
Mead also undermines a series of Supreme Court cases that
accepted the administrative interpretive voice for administrative
interpretations of its own regulations. For example, Seminole Rock
involved a dispute over the meaning of the words "highest price" in
regulations issued by the Office of Price Administration pursuant to
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.103 The Court stated:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative
regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the
words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the
principles of the Constitution in some situations may be
relevant in the first instance in choosing between various
constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation. 104
100. Id. at 448.

101. Id. at 451.
102. See id. The Sixth Circuit in Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2003) reads Boeing as requiring Chevron
deference for interpretive regulations. Id. at 140-41.
103. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
104. Id. at 413-14.
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In Auer, the Supreme Court gave Seminole Rock deference to
the Department of Labor's clarification of a regulation set forth in an
amicus brief filed at the request of the Court. 105 The court
explained, "[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on
the matter in question."' 1 6 In Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala, °7 the Department of Health and Human Services
interpreted its own regulations as barring reimbursement for certain
educational costs incurred by a teaching hospital. 10 8 The Court
wrote:
We must give substantial deference to an agency's
This broad
interpretation of its own regulations ....
deference is all the more warranted when, as here, the
regulation concerns "a complex and highly technical
regulatory program," in which the identification and
classification of relevant "criteria necessarily require
the exercise of judgment
significant expertise and entail
10 9
grounded in policy concerns."'
The rationale for this line of cases is, in part, Chevron's notion
of delegation. If Congress has delegated power to an agency to fill in
legislative gaps, then courts should defer to any reasonable
interpretation that an agency provides with respect to its own
regulations. Because agencies are part of the executive branch under
an elected President, it is more appropriate that an agency, rather
According to this line of
than a court, undertake that function.'
cases, these kinds of situations require interpretation from the
administrative agency's point of view, the cadences of the
administrative rather than the judicial voice.l'l
So long as courts read Chevron broadly, there is no need to sort
out the different justifications underlying Seminole Rock deference.
105. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
106. Id. at 462.
107. 512 U.S. 504 (1996).
108. Id. at 506.
109. Id. at 512 (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,
697 (1991)).
110. See John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference
to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 627-44

(1996).
111. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512.
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Mead, however, casts the Seminole Rock line of cases' authority into
question by conditioning Chevron deference not only on Congress
delegating rulemaking authority to the agency, but also on the
agency's interpretation being promulgated in the exercise of that
authority. Although Mead never mentions Seminole Rock, and thus
does not address its continuing viability, lower courts have begun to
do so, both implicitly and explicitly.
For example, the Seventh Circuit implicitly questioned the
continued vitality of Seminole Rock in Matz v. Household
InternationalTax Reduction Investment Plan"' (Matz fl). This 2001
decision reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Matz v.
Household InternationalTax Reduction Plan"3 (Matz I) in which the
Supreme Court had vacated and remanded in light of Mead.'1 4 In
Matz II the court had to decide whether both vested and non-vested
participants, or only non-vested participants, should be counted in
determining whether partial termination of a retirement plan has
In the first opinion, the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to
occurred."
Chevron, deferred to the IRS's position in its amicus brief that both
categories should be counted. 1" 6 On remand, the court rejected the
IRS's interpretation, holding that only non-vested participants should
be counted. The court wrote:
[u]pon reading Mead, we find that a litigation position in an
amicus brief, perhaps just as agency interpretations of
statutes contained in formats such as opinion letters, policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines are
entitled to respect only to the extent that those
interpretations have the power to persuade pursuant to
Skidmore. 117
In Matz II the court interpreted Mead as requiring reliance on
Skidmore rather than on Auer and its progeny in giving judicial
deference to informal agency interpretations. In its list of citations,
the court used a "but see" signal to introduce Auer and Jones v.
112. 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
113. 227 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated by 533 U.S. 925 (2001),
remanded to 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
114. Id.
115. Matz, 265 F.3d at 575-76.
116. Matz, 227 F.3d at 976.
117. Matz, 265 F.3d at 575 (citation omitted).
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American
Postal Workers
118briefs
In Jones,
a lower
were deferred
not post
because
they court
amicus
in agencyUnion.
to interpretations
hoe rationalizations, and they reflected the agency's fair and
considered judgment.119 Thus, the Matz II court did not consider
did
these precedents binding post-Mead. 20 z
Another Seventh Circuit decision, Keys v. Barnhart, explicitly
questions Auer and Seminole Rock. At issue was whether to defer to
the government's amicus brief position that old rather than new
a disabled child's eligibility for Social
regulations should govem
Security benefits. 122 Judge Posner, citing both Mead and Matz I,
wrote "briefs, it seems, get limited deference. 123 He continues,
"[otur hedge ('it seems') is because Auer v. Robbins ave full
Judge
Chevron deference to an agency's amicus curiae brief."
Posner's opinion relies on Mead to conclude, "[p]robably there is
little left of Auer."'125 He reasons that, as interpreted by Mead, the
"theory of Chevron is that Congress delegates to agencies the power
to make law to fill gaps in statutes" and "[i]t is odd to think of
agencies as making laws by means of statements made in
,,126
briefs.
Insofar as Mead calls for rejecting Seminole Rock and Auer, it
has the effect of limiting the administrative interpretive voice. The
justification for deference to administrative interpretations of
regulations rests in part on the need to hear the administrative voice
and its distinctive accents. The reasoning of Mead mutes this point
of view.
V. SKIDMORE REVIVED

Mead does not silence the administrative voice. Step Two of
Chevron remains, albeit in diminished form. Moreover, Mead gives
prominence to Skidmore. Although the Supreme Court held in Mead
that a tariff classification ruling issued by the United States Customs
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

192 F.3d417 (4th Cir. 1999).

Id. at 427.
Matz, 265 F.3d at 575.
347 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 992.
Id. at 993 (citing Mead and Matz II).
Id. (citation omitted).

Id.
Id. at 993-94.
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Service was not entitled to the strong deference of Chevron's Step
Two, 127 the Court determined that the administrative ruling was
"eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness" under
Skidmore. 128 However uncertain Skidmore's reach, it seems at least
to require courts to consider the possibility of giving the deference to
administrative voice by analyzing the factors that could lead to
accepting the administrative interpretation.
This reincarnation of Skidmore will diminish deference to
administrative agencies in some cases and expand it in others. As a
result of Mead, some agency interpretations that previously received
deference under Chevron's Step Two will now receive only the
possibility of deference under Skidmore. For example, prior to
Mead, the Sixth Circuit granted Chevron deference to IRS revenue
rulings, 129 but after Mead, decided such rulings were entitled to
Skidmore's more limited deference. 130 In other cases, interpretations
that received no deference under Chevron may now be entitled to
deference under Skidmore. For example, final decisions of the Patent
and Trademark Office have not been entitled to any deference under
Step Two of Chevron because Congress has not vested the office
with "any general substantive rulemaking power."' 131 Mead also
requires that agencies have rulemaking power to be given Chevron
deference, but after Mead, the decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office may receive deference under Skidmore. Thus, Mead
strengthens the weight of Patent and Trademark Office decisions and
permits judicial deference to them in a way not possible before
Mead.
According to Skidmore, "[tihe weight [accorded to an
administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."' 132 The Court in Mead quotes this language from Skidmore
127. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
128. Id.
129. For a more detailed discussion of revenue rulings, see infra Part V.A.
130. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir. 2003).
For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
223-241.
131. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
132. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994).
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and then offers a slightly different list: "[T]he degree of the agency's
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and... the
persuasiveness of the agency's position." 133 Later, Mead gives yet
another list of factors for deference: "[T]he merit of [the] writer's
its fit with prior interpretations,
thoroughness, logic and expertness,
1 34
weight.
of
sources
other
any
and
Thus Skidmore is a multi-factor and open-ended test. It does not
specify or limit the factors for a court to consider. It gives no
guidance as to what weight each factor should bear. As Justice
Scalia observes in his dissent in Mead, Skidmore represents "that test
most beloved by a court... th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances'
test."'1 35 Nonetheless, the various formulations of Mead and its
application in cases make three factors particularly important:
expertise, consistency, and validity of reasoning. As discussed
Skidmore factors direct administrative
below, on balance, these key
13
courts.
like
act
to
agencies
A. The Role of Expertise
Under Chevron, both before and after Mead, expertise does not
ensure deference, as the example of the Patent and Trademark Office
discussed above demonstrates.' 3 7 All formulations of Skidmore
deference, however, assign an important role to expertise. Since
expertise is a particular strength of administrative agencies, this
factor seems to favor judicial deference to administrative agencies.
In Skidmore itself, the administrative agency was not even a party to
the action, which involved a dispute between employees and their
employer over overtime compensation.138 It was expertise that
triggered possible deference to the ruling of the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division, since "the Administrator's policies are
made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely
to come to a judge in a particular case."1 39 Skidmore further explains
133. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted). For a list of Skidmore
factors, see infra Part V.B-C.

134. Mead, at 235.
135. Id. at 241.
136. See infra Part V.A-C.

137. See supra text accompanying note 131.
138. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 135 (1944).
139. Id. at 139.
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that the views of the agency implementing a statute "constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance."' 40 Mead also assigns a
high value to expertise: "There is room at least to raise a Skidmore
claim here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and
Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on
the subtle questions in this case .... *)141
When however, as in Mead itself there is a specialized court
reviewing the administrative agency, the Skidmore factor of expertise
does not so neatly support granting deference to the administrative
agency. As noted earlier, in tax, the specialized Tax Court hears the
vast majority of tax cases. 142 The Tax Court's attitude toward
revenue rulings highlights the tensions inherent in application of
Skidmore by specialized courts.
Revenue rulings are official interpretations by the IRS issued by
the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS and published in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin as the IRS's legal conclusions based on
stated facts. 143 Revenue rulings are an important source of
administrative interpretation for tax law.' 44 The IRS describes
revenue rulings as promoting uniform application of tax laws and
145
assisting taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance.
The weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin states explicitly that revenue
rulings and revenue procedures "do not have the force and effect of
T reasury D.art men t regulations," but they may be used as
precedents."146

In Mead Corp. v. United States,147 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, comparing trade and tax matters, observed:
"Customs' classifications rulings are in some ways an even less

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 140.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001).
See sources cited supra note 36.
See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2004); Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1

C.B 5.
144. In 2003, for example, the IRS published 128 revenue rulings. 2003
I.R.B. 1211.
145. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-14 C.B. 814, 814-15.
146. Id. at 815.
147. 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), rev'd,
283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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formalized body of interpretation than IRS revenue rulings.' ' 148 If,
according to the Supreme Court in Mead, tariff classifications might
deserve some deference under Skidmore, 149 it is unclear whether the
more formalized body of interpretations represented by revenue
rulings require the strong deference of Chevron's Step Two.
The Tax Court has traditionally afforded revenue rulings no
deference whatsoever. Mead's invocation of Skidmore for tariff
rulings, however, seems to undermine the Tax Court's attitude
toward revenue rulings, and Mead has in fact begun to influence the
Tax Court's attitude toward revenue rulings. In Lunsford v.
Commissioner,150 Judge Halpem's concurring opinion, while it
acknowledges that the Tax Court has taken the view that revenue
rulings receive no deference because they are merely opinions of a
lawyer in the agency,' 5 ' it also refers to Mead in a "but see" citation,
"for a discussion of the deference, less than Chevron deference,
owed to certain agency interpretations of a statute."' 5 2 In Medical
Emergency Care Associates v. Commissioner,153 the Tax Court
discussed Mead and its invocation of Skidmore but nevertheless
declined to defer to a revenue ruling, concluding, "we are unable to
ascertain the thoroughness of the agency's consideration or the
validity of its reasoning."' 154 Thus, while Mead does not require or
ensure deference by the Tax Court to IRS revenue rulings, Medical
Emergency Care Associates demonstrates that its reasoning increases
the likelihood of such deference by requiring the Tax Court to give
weight to IRS expertise and to justify any decision not to defer to a
revenue ruling through an analysis of Skidmore factors.
Depending on the degree to which Mead narrows Chevron's
reach in the long run, applying Skidmore may decrease rather than
increase the Tax Court's deference to the IRS. In 1943, the Supreme
Court wrote of the Tax Court, which had not yet been constituted as

148. Id. at 1308.
149. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,221 (2001).
150. 117 T.C. 159 (2001).
151. Id. at 174 n.6 (Halpern, J., concurring).
152. Id. Recent decisions of the Courts of Appeals have generally afforded
revenue rulings Skidmore deference. See Salem et al., supra note 71, at 76870.
153. 120 T.C. 436 (2003).
154. Id. at 445.
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an Article I court:'
[E]very reason ever advanced in support of administrative
finality applies to the Tax Court. The court is independent,
and its neutrality is not clouded by prosecuting duties. Its
procedures assure fair hearings.
Its deliberations are
evidenced by careful opinions. All guides to judgment
available to judges are habitually consulted and respected.
It has established a tradition of freedom from bias and
pressures. It deals with a subject that is highly specialized ....

Its members not infrequently bring to their task

long legislative or administrative experience in their
subject. The volume of tax matters flowing through the Tax
Court keeps its members abreast of changing statutes,
regulations, and Bureau practices, informed as to the
background of controversies and aware of the impact of
their decisions on both Treasury and taxpayer. Individual
cases are disposed of wholly on records publicly made, in
adversary proceedings,156and the court has no responsibility
for previous handling.
Such a view of the Tax Court reflects factors like those of Skidmore
and demonstrates the judicial preference for the judicial voice. If
courts find that Skidmore applies to many administrative interpretations and if expertise is deemed a particularly important Skidmore
factor, the reasoning of Mead may over time serve to decrease, rather
than increase, deference by specialized courts such as the Tax Court
to the administrative agencies they review. 157 Thus, the Tax Court
exposes tensions inherent in application of Skidmore by specialized

155. The body, originally called the Board of Tax Appeals, was created as an
independent executive agency outside the Treasury Department by the
Revenue Act of 1924 and remained as such until 1942. The Revenue Act of
1926 provided for direct appeal of its decisions to the circuit courts of appeals.
In 1941, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
described it as "a court in all but name." REPORT OF THE COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROCEDURE, S. DOc. No. 77-8, at 205 (1st Sess. 1941). In 1942, its name was
changed to the Tax Court of the United States. It became an Article I court in
1969. See David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions:
Dobson Revisited, 49 TAx LAW. 629, 632-36 (1996).
156. Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
157. The use of Skidmore and Chevron by specialist courts would thus seem
a fruitful area for further study.
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courts. 1

Of course, the dispute in Mead, as to whether the United States
Customs Service properly classified day planners as bound diaries
under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, was heard by both a
specialized trial court and appellate court-the Court of International
Trade' 5 9 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, respectively. 160 The Court of International Trade has
jurisdiction over suits arising out of agency actions on import
transactions. 161 The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit includes appeals in the areas of tax, patent, trade,
trademarks, takings, and contracts. 62 Nowhere in Mead's majority
opinion, however, does the Supreme Court suggest that the
specialized nature of trial and appellate courts eliminates the need to
consider the possibility of deference under Skidmore. Quite to the
of Skidmore deference even in
contrary, Mead calls for consideration
63
1
review.
specialized
such
of
the face
But neither does Mead indicate how strongly the factor of
expertise shall be weighed. It refers to "Skidmore's recognition of
various justifications for deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency action...."164 Skidmore, unlike Chevron, does
not rely on theories of Congressional delegation that would require
even an expert and specialized court to defer to the administrative
agency. Under Skidmore, courts decide what the best interpretation
of statutory language is and which of the many Skidmore factors to
emphasize. A statutory scheme that involves judicial review by
specialized bodies will likely reduce judicial deference to administrative agencies on the basis of the agency's expertise. A specialized
tribunal with its own expertise can be expected as a general matter to
158. Examples of other specialized courts include the Court of International
Trade and the Court of Veterans Appeals. See Revesz, supra note 36 at 11113.
159. Mead Corp. v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 707 (1998), rev'd, 185
F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), rev'd, 283 F.3d
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
160. Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
161. See Hon. Gregory W. Carman, The Jurisdiction of the United States
Court ofInternationalTrade: A Dilemmafor PotentialLitigants, 22 STETSON

L. REv. 157, 160-62 (1992).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2004).
163. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
164. Id. at 237.
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give less weight to administrative expertise as a factor favoring
deference and thus decline to65 find the agency's expert opinion
persuasive in a particular case.1
The presence of a specialized court also complicates review by
generalist appellate courts. 166 Courts of appeals in such cases will
have to consider the reasoning of two expert bodies, the administrative agency and the specialized court, and decide which, if either,
persuades it.
For generalist courts, expertise may be of diminished
importance under Skidmore in another way as well. Language in
Skidmore and Mead can be read as treating expertise as the trigger
for deference under Skidmore.! 67 In other words, expertise could be
seen not as an independent factor supporting deference, but as the
reason a court "cannot ignore the agency interpretation" and "must
assess that interpretation against multiple factors and determine what
weight they should be given.' 168 Thus, given the presence of
specialized courts and the view of expertise as the trigger for
165. Revesz, supra note 36, at 1139-55. Revesz reasons that specialist
courts may decrease the effectiveness of congressional delegation of legislative
authority to administrative agencies because they are more likely to show
systematic biases. Id. at 1146. If such is the case, greater reliance on Skidmore
would exacerbate this problem. Cf Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional
Dimension of Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV.
952, 964 (2003) (noting that specialized judges "are more likely to see
themselves as helping the legislature achieve the goals of a program").
166. In the case of the Tax Court, this question is further complicated by
disputes about the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section 7482, in which
section 7482(a)(1) provides that Tax Court decisions shall be reviewed "in the
same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil
actions tried without a jury," and in which section 7482(c)(1) provides for
reversal of Tax Court decisions if they are "not in accordance with law."
I.R.C. § 7482 (a)(1), (c)(1) (2003); see Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the
Perils of the Second Best: Why HeightenedAppellate Deference to Tax Court
Decisions Is Undesirable,77 OR. L. REv. 235 (1998); Shores, supra note 155,
at 631-32; David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions:
Taking InstitutionalChoice Seriously, 55 TAx LAW. 667 (2002). For cases that
are appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as was the case in
Mead, the specialized nature of that court's jurisdiction is itself a further
complication.
167. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994); Mead, 533 U.S. at
228.
168. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 855 (2001).
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deference under Skidmore, expertise may prove to have a
surprisingly small role in the ultimate degree of deference courts
accord an administrative agency.
B. Skidmore 's Reliance on Consistency
Another key factor under both Skidmore itself and Mead's
understanding of Skidmore is an administrative interpretation's
"consistency with earlier and later pronouncements."' 169 Professor
Rossi writes, "[o]f all the Skidmore factors, consistency seems most
widely used."' 170 "Consistency," of course, can have many meanings.
In one sense, it may mean looking at a snapshot of administrative
interpretations to ask whether an agency interpretation is consistent
with other agency interpretations outstanding at the time of judicial
review. If the interpretation is inconsistent, it is unlikely to receive
deference under Skidmore.17 1 In another sense, emphasizing
consistency directs courts to give weight to interpretations that have
not changed over time, affording longstanding administrative
interpretations respect, in part, simply because they are longstanding. 172 To the extent Skidmore promotes the second sense of
consistency, "remaining unchanged," it calls on administrative
agencies to adhere to a kind of stare decisis in order to merit judicial
deference. Many of the explanations and justifications for stare
decisis, however, are particularly judicial and do not apply to the
administrative process.
169. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). The Mead
court quotes Skidmore's list and then restates the factors as the "degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness" as well as the

"persuasiveness of the agency's position." Id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
139-40) (footnotes omitted).
170. Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1144 (2001).

171. For example, in United States Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270
F.3d 1137, 1147 (7th Cir. 2001), the court found that the IRS position in
revenue rulings and other cases regarding the requirements for capitalizing

expenses evidenced no consistent practice and thus rejected the IRS's litigating
position in the case. See infra text accompanying notes 220-222.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 209 (2001) (upholding revenue ruling that reflects agency's longstanding
interpretation). Commentators have emphasized the importance of an interpretation being longstanding under the Skidmore calculus. See Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 (1990); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 168, at 856.
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Reliance on stare decisis is closely linked to common law cases
that lack statutory language as a source to limit the freedom of the
judiciary. 173 For example, before his appointment to the Supreme
Court, Stanley Reed wrote that "'the doctrine of stare decisis has a
philosophic necessity in the common law system which is not found
elsewhere,' because the common law 'amounts to no more than a
collection of decided cases." ' 174
In contrast, administrative
interpretations reflect interpretations of statutory language and thus
raise very different concerns.
Commentators also link stare decisis to the judiciary's lack of
expertise. Jonathan Macey writes:
Stare decisis enables judges to leverage a single skill-the
ability to tell when like cases are alike-into a facility for
deciding a wide variety of cases that involve substantive
legal issues about which the judges may know next to
nothing. In a complex world dominated by courts of
general jurisdiction, in which lawyers may specialize but
judges are expected to master hundreds of disparate areas of
law, this attribute of stare decisis should not be
175
minimized.
Administrative agencies, on the other hand, have no need to look to
substitutes for expertise.
Another proffered justification for precedent is that it
encourages judges to exercise care and foresight when announcing a
new rule in deciding a case. Knowing that future courts will treat
their decision as a precedent, judges "must attempt to anticipate the
range of future cases to which a rule will apply... [and] predict the
consequences of future applications of the rule in the process of
173. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents,
87 VA. L. REv. 1, 8 (2001) ("Antebellum Americans embraced stare decisis to
restrain the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise give
judges.... ").

174. Id. at 22 (quoting Stanley Reed, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalLaw, 9

PA. Bus. ASS'N Q. 131, 133 (1938)).
175. Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium on Post-ChicagoLaw and Economics:
The Internaland External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT

L. REv. 93, 95 (1989); see also Nelson, supra note 173, at 56 ("To the
contrary, judges often will not be well positioned to decide cases of first
impression; the judges who happen to confront an issue first may have only
average abilities and be relatively unfamiliar with the relevant body of law.").
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176
deciding... a case as well as in choosing the rule to announce."'
A court is expected to undertake this kind of consideration while
deciding the dispute between the two parties before it.
Administrative agencies also can, and do, devote considerable time
and resources to predicting the impact of its rules and regulations.
Agencies, unlike courts however, hear from and can consult with a
variety of parties likely to be affected by their rules.
Stare decisis has come to represent a key component of the
judiciary's legitimacy. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor's
joint decision declared that "[t]he Court's power lies.. . in its
legitimacy," and that preserving that legitimacy required not
overruling Roe v. Wade. 17 7 Although dissenting in the case, Justice
Rehnquist nonetheless agreed with the principle:
The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from
following public opinion, but from deciding by its best
lights whether legislative enactments of the popular
branches of Government comport with the Constitution.
The doctrine of stare decisis is an adjunct of this duty, and
should be no more subject to 7the vagaries of public opinion
than is the basic judicial task.1 1
The legitimacy of administrative decisions stands on very
different grounds. As Chevron recognizes, administrative agencies
can claim the democratic pedigree of the elected President.' 7 They
are subject to congressional oversight. They have the advantage of
expertise as well as input from affected parties. Their interpretations
are not the result of a single judge or even a panel of judges.

176. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO.

L.J. 2225, 2238 (1997).
177. 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
178. Id. at 963 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), see also Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 600 (1987) ("[T]his subordination of
decisional and decisionmaker variance is likely in practice to increase the
power of the decisionmaking institution. If internal consistency strengthens

external credibility, then minimizing internal inconsistency by standardizing
decisions within a decisionmaking environment may generally strengthen that
decisionmaking environment as an institution.")
179. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(recognizing that agencies may legitimately make policy choices because they

derive their power from Congress, while judges lack expertise and are not
members of the executive or legislative branches of government).
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Some of the justifications for reliance on precedent do apply to
administrative agencies. Consistency promotes notions of equity, the
notion that likes are treated alike. It acknowledges reliance and
promotes predictability, which is useful for planning. But as
Professor Schauer has observed, stare decisis through reliance on
80
precedent represents a focus on "stability for stability's sake."'
Stability for stability's sake is only one important value for the
administrative state. By forcing administrative agencies to speak in a
judicial voice, it furthers the ossification of the administrative
process and limits agencies' ability to make changes to respond to
new technologies, new political realities, and new circumstances.
Tax interpretive regulations, those regulations promulgated
under the authority of section 7805(a), illustrate how an expansion of
Skidmore may mute the administrative interpretive voice. As
discussed earlier, Mead requires that an administrative interpretation
be promulgated in the exercise of authority carrying the force of law
in order to merit Chevron deference, and this requirement has led
some commentators and courts to conclude that tax interpretive
regulations merit only Skidmore rather than Chevron deference. 181 If
courts apply the various factors of Skidmore's weak deference to
such regulations, the likely result in most cases is likely to be judicial
validation of such regulations. Such regulations are subject to
careful consideration as well as notice and comment procedures and
include elaborate p8reambles explaining the agency's decisions and
reasoning process.
But validation of the regulations will not always be the case.
Regulations promulgated under section 7805(a) also reflect policy
needs and often require amendment in order to respond to changes in
political and economic circumstances. The Skidmore factors give
prominence to the conservative judicial values of consistency with
prior interpretations. A court applying Skidmore may feel obligated
to look skeptically upon interpretive tax regulations that modify a
long-settled position.
That is, even if courts were generally to uphold interpretive tax
regulations under Skidmore deference, Mead's expansion of Skidmore
could nonetheless contribute significantly to the ossification of the
180. Schauer, supra note 178, at 601.
181. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
182. See Salem et al., supra note 71, at 733-35.
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administrative process. As Justice Scalia points out in his dissent in
Mead, Skidmore and Chevron differ sharply in how they view a
change in an agency's position. 183 For any interpretation that has
been subject to deference under Skidmore, it is possible that
administrative agencies will be powerless to revise the rejected
position. "What a court says is the law after according Skidmore
deference will be the law forever, beyond the power of the agency to
change even through rulemaking."18 4
Justice Scalia draws this conclusion from a trilogy of cases, 8 5
all of which were decided after Chevron, holding that if a Supreme
Court statutory interpretation precedes that of the agency, the
Supreme Court interpretation becomes part of the statute's meaning,
resolving any inherent ambiguity and foreclosing the administrative
186
agency from making a different choice under Chevron Step Two.
183. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247-48 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see Bressman, supra note 19, at 540 ("Agencies that forego lawlike procedures and settle for Skidmore deference run the risk of losing the
ability to change their interpretations in the future.").
184. Mead, 533 U.S. at 249-50 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
185. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527 (1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S.
116 (1990). Only one case has relied on this trilogy to invalidate a tax
regulation. In Bankers Trust New York Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368,
1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied
on Neal and Maislin in deciding that a preexisting precedent trumped Chevron
deference to a tax regulation involving foreign tax credits.
186. Neal, Lechmere, and Maislin rest on the premise that Congress, and not
the courts, must act to revise statutes and that congressional inaction is
tantamount to approval of the Court's interpretation. See generally Kenneth A.
Bamberger, ProvisionalPrecedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1291 (2002) (citing Neal, Lechmere,
and Maislin to argue that despite Chevron's adjustments to the rule of judicial
interpretive primacy, the Supreme Court squarely rejected expansion of
agencies' interpretive authority of administrative statutes); Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 164, at 839 (citing Neal, Lechmere, and Maislin in arguing that the
Court insists that Chevron does not trump prior interpretations of statutes
adopted by the Court itself); Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury:
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) (noting that the court has failed to reconcile these
three cases with the stare decisis effect of non-Chevron judicial constraints);
Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV.
185, 188 (2004) (asserting that based on Neal, Lechmere, and Maislin, the
Chevron issue should never be reached when assessing the validity of "checkthe-box" regulations).
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In Neal a unanimous Supreme Court found, because of its prior
decision in Chapman v. United States, 8 7 the Sentencing Commission
was powerless to change an interpretation of a statute that the weight
of blotter paper bearing LSD must be considered for determining
whether the quantity crossed a weight threshold for triggering a
minimum ten year sentence, even though this interpretation produced
a "significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offenders
relative to other narcotics traffickers."'18 8 The Neal Court explained,
"[o]nce we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our
agency's
ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess ' an
89
later interpretation of the statute against that settled law."'
In this trilogy of cases, the Court invokes stare decisis, the
mainstay of the judicial voice, to reject the administrative voice.
Deference under Skidmore will likely have the same effect. Shifts in
position resulting from changing policy or changing needs are
particularly difficult to accommodate under Skidmore's emphasis on
consistency.
C. Validity of the Agency 's Reasoning
Another set of Skidmore factors considers the thoroughness and
validity of the agency's reasoning. These factors, which are in my
view the most important, further demonstrate the Court's "judicializing" of administrative agencies,190 making them behave more like
courts than legislatures. We require courts, especially appellate
courts, to explain the basis for their decisions. We do not, however,
ask the same of legislatures. As Professor Schauer has observed,
"Typically, drafters of statutes, like sergeants and parents, simply do
not see the need to give reasons, and often see a strong need not
to . .

,,191

The reasoned decision-making factor is further complicated by
current statutory criteria for agency reasoning. The Administrative
Procedure Act requires agencies to incorporate "a concise general
187. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
188. Neal, 516 U.S. at 295.

189. Id.
190. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protectingthe Constitutionfrom
the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1

(2003) (criticizing the Supreme Court for requiring Congress to act like a court
in assembling evidence to define constitutional rights).
191. Schauer, supra note 174, at 636.

December 2005]

THE INTERPRETIVE VOICE

2119

statement of their basis and purpose" into rules adopted after notice
and comment. 192 Under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, a court has the authority to "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, 93an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."'
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 194 the Supreme Court explained what an
agency must do to survive arbitrary and capricious review. The
requirements set forth far exceed the "concise general statement" of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 195 According to the Court, "the
agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made." ' 196 The reviewing court must
"consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment."' 197 Moreover,
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.198
192. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2001).
193. Id. § 706(2)(A) (2001).
194. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2001). Professors Shapiro and Levy have observed
that the Court in State Farm "left the doctrinal basis of the requirement[s]
unclear." Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasonsfor Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 425 (1987).
196. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United

States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). In an observation of relevance to the
Skidmore factor of consistency, the Court also wrote that "an agency changing
its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the
change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the
first instance." Id. at 42.
197. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best FreightSys.,
419 U.S. 281, 285 (1975)).
198. Id.
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To avoid being found arbitrary and capricious, the agency must also
consider certain policy alternatives.' 99 All of these considerations
must be made during the decision-making process as "courts may not
accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency
be upheld,
action. It is well established that an agency's action 2must
0
itself.,
agency
the
by
articulated
basis
the
on
all,
if at
A number of administrative law scholars have explored the
relationship between stringent judicial review of administrative
reasoning, known as "hard look" review, and the reasonableness
requirement for agency interpretations under Step Two of Chevron.
For example, Elizabeth Magill suggests it is possible to characterize
Chevron as "an outcome-driven test; it asks whether a reasonable
reader could adopt the agency's interpretation of the statute. State
Farm, on the other hand, looks to the reasoning process followed by
the agency." 201 Nonetheless, she and others argue that reasonableness review under Step Two of Chevron should be the
Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious test-that is,
the criteria of State Farm.20 2 If both Chevron's Step Two and
arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure
Act apply to agency actions with the force of law, logic requires that
the same set of requirements apply to the agency's reasoning.
If such is the case, then judicial review of agency reasoning
under Skidmore should be even more demanding. In a thoughtful
article written before the Supreme Court's decision in Mead,
Professor Rossi speculated that the Skidmore test appeared "notably
199. Id. at 51.
200. Id. at 50.
201. Magill, supra note 65, at 10.
202. Id.

at

9-11; KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (3d ed. Cum. Supp. 2000); William S.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Jordan, III, JudicialReview of Informal Statutory Interpretations:The Answer
is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719
(2002); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of
Explanationfor Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996); Ronald
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.

REV. 1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73

L. REV. 83 (1994). In Mead itself, the Court quotes the reasonableness
test of Chevron Step Two and then gives a compare cite to the arbitrary and
capricious test of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).

TEX.
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more rigorous than the routine reasonableness inquiry at Chevron's
step two .... Skidmore might be considered a hard look with a
special emphasis on consistency and the depth of reasoning-rather
than routine rationality review, which focuses more on coherence
than the thoroughness or depth of the agency's reasoning .... ,203
Professor Rossi, however, advocates "conceptualizing Skidmore
deference as a type of step-two inquiry,' 2°4 as "a hard look with a
special emphasis on consistency and the depth of reasoning .. .,205
The metaphor of the interpretive voice highlights the differences
between Chevron's Step Two and Skidmore. It exposes the doctrines
not simply as different varieties of a single deference doctrine or
points on a continuum, but as fundamentally opposed approaches to
how courts view administrative agencies.2 °6 Skidmore accepts a
judicial model for administrative actions. Similarly, hard look
review asks administrative agencies to sound and reason like courts.
Thus, within Skidmore's judicial model, hard look review seems to
make sense. Chevron, in contrast, adopting a legislative model for
administrative interpretation, recognizes that Congress has delegated
20 7
administrative agencies the authority to make policy decisions.
Under this legislative vision, Chevron Step Two should indeed be a
highly deferential, outcome-driven review, limited to determining

203. Rossi, supra note 170, at 1143, 1146.
204. Id. at 1144.
205. Id. at 1146. See also Jordan, supra note 202, at 727, 732-33 (arguing
for Chevron Step Two instead of Skidmore, finding Skidmore insufficiently
deferential).

206. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 168, at 858 (characterizing Chevron
and Skidmore as two "distinctly different doctrines").
207. Professor Cross would take this vision so far as to eliminate judicial
review of rulemaking:
Abolishing judicial review of rulemaking may seem radical, but, in
fact, the elimination is little more than a recognition of the "quasilegislative" function of promulgating rules.... "Political principles
would support basing a regulatory process on a legislative model
instead of its current reliance on judicial-like procedure."... It is
appropriate, therefore, for courts to treat agency discretion like they
treat congressional discretion and to stop second-guessing agency
judgments.
Cross, Shattering, supra note 29, at 1330 (quoting Phillip J. Harter, The
Political Legitimacy of JudicialReview of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U. L.
REv. 471,475 (1983)).
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whether the agency has made a clear error. 2 8 Chevron's Step Two
appropriately allows the administrative voice to speak loudly and
clearly.
Viewing the Supreme Court's decision in Mead through the lens
of the interpretive voice provides a new perspective on the longrunning debate about ossification of the rulemaking process.
Commentators sharply disagree as to whether rigorous judicial
review harms or improves the rulemaking process, 209 whether it
diverts agency resources and encourages agency inaction, or whether
it encourages careful deliberation and prevents arbitrariness. Use of
the interpretive voice as a tool for analysis supports the position that
judicial review leads to ossification. For example, State Farm's
requirements compel administrative agencies to speak in the judicial
voice even when agencies are acting in a legislative mode by
promulgating rules which have the force of law. Thus, vigorous
judicial review of agency reasoning requires agencies to think and
act like courts, even when doing so is inappropriate and inconsistent
with the framework the court is attempting to apply.
Nonetheless the examples of interpretive tax regulations and
revenue rulings show how, both in theory and practice, neat
distinctions become blurred. Interpretive tax regulations are entitled
some degree of deference, although it is unclear whether it is that of
Chevron's Step Two or Skidmore.210 Assume for the moment that
208. Cf Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637,
2674 (2003) (noting that the "best way to think about this sort of judicial
review is to understand it as a method to detect clear mistakes").
209. See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of
Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1013 (2000); William S. Jordan
III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitraryand CapriciousReview Significantly
Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Thomas 0. McGarity, The
Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., JudicialReview
ofAgency Actions in a PeriodofDiminishingAgency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 61 (1997); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The CritiqueofActive JudicialReview

of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997);

Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity andJudicialReview of

Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002) [hereinafter Seidenfeld,

Cognitive Loafing]; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossfication:Rethinking
Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment

Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
210. See supra sources cited supra note 81.

December 2005]

THE INTERPRETIVE VOICE

2123

the appropriate level of deference given to interpretive tax
regulations is Chevron deference.
Under Step Two's highly
deferential review, a court would subject the agency's reasoning to
only a cursory examination. In practice, however, the Treasury and
IRS prepare lengthy preambles containing exhaustive explanations of
agency reactions to public comments and the reasoning behind the
21
regulations. '
Because a consensus is emerging that revenue rulings are
entitled to Skidmore deference, 212 less uncertainty surrounds the level
of deference applied to revenue rulings than to interpretive tax
regulations. The Internal Revenue Manual explains "conclusions
expressed in Revenue Rulings will be directly responsive to and
213
limited in scope by the pivotal facts stated in the Revenue Ruling."
Revenue rulings are seldom more than a few pages long. They
generally posit a fact pattern, briefly set forth the applicable Internal
Revenue Code provisions, regulations, or other authorities, and recite
214
a holding.
Revenue rulings, however, seldom include detailed expositions
of their reasoning. Revenue rulings generally leave it to the reader to
discern the reasoning that led from the stated law to the holding.
Thus, application of the Skidmore factors that call for vigorous
review of agency reasoning may not support granting deference to
revenue rulings.
It would be an enormous misallocation of agency resources to
devote energy to explaining the basis of informal interpretations
211. For recent examples, see, for example, T.D. 9142, 2000-34 I.R.B. 308
(regulations providing guidance under section 408 for setting up deemed
individual retirement accounts within employer-provided retirement plans);
T.D. 9141, 2004-34 I.R.B. 359 (regulations on foreign tax credit limitations
under section 904); T.D. 9137, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 9137 (2004) (regulations
under section 460 regarding partnership transactions involving long-term
contracts).
212. Salem et al., supra note 71, at 729-30, 735-36; see supra text accompanying notes 143-146, 150-154.
213. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL para.

1.2.1.11.12 (2005), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/ch02s04.html.
214. For recent examples, see Rev. Rul. 2004-80, 2004-32 I.R.B. 164, which

subjected towing vehicle to retail excise tax; Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31

I.R.B. 108, which characterized debt instruments as a security in corporate
reorganizations; and Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-27 I.R.B. 7, which, in certain
circumstances, considered gift and estate tax to be consequences of a grantor
trust.
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lacking the force of law merely to survive Skidmore review. Yet by
expanding Skidmore's reach, Mead encourages agencies to do
precisely that. Undoubtedly, it is more important for agencies to
expend their resources developing and explaining rules that bind the
public. Thus State Farm's exacting demands on legislative regulations are understandable. Moreover, Chevron deference tempers
these demands. Under Skidmore, however, no such presumptive
deference balances the burden imposed on the agency to explain its
reasoning. Thus, Skidmore encourages more elaborate explanation
for less important interpretations, and Mead's expansion of the
judicial voice is likely to contribute to further ossification of the
administrative process. It encourages agencies to make choices that
bring with them Chevron deference even when such choices may be
more burdensome than the issue merits or may unduly complicate the
procedures used in developing informal interpretations.
D. Post-Mead Practice
In his dissent in Mead, Justice Scalia worries that invocation of
Skidmore strengthens the administrative voice. He writes "whereas
previously, when agency authority to resolve ambiguity did not exist
the court was free to give the statute what it considered the best
interpretation, henceforth the court must supposedly give the agency
view some indeterminate amount of so-called Skidmore deference." 2 15 This fear has not been realized. To the contrary, courts
following Mead's direction to apply Skidmore have felt free to reject
administrative interpretations.
Tax cases aptly illustrate this judicial response to Mead. The Matz
and Medical Emergency Care Associates opinions, discussed above,
provide two examples. 216 O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner,2 17 presents
another. In O'Shaughnessy,the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
rejected the IRS's argument that Mead calls for deference to a 1975
revenue ruling concluding that tin used in the manufacture of glass was
not depreciable property.2 18 The court found that substantial changes
to the applicable statutory scheme governing depreciation deductions
215. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 112-120, 153-154.
217. 332 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2003).
218. Id. at 1131.
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219
since passage of the 1975 ruling undermined its authority.
Similarly, in US. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an IRS revenue ruling
determining that benefits extending "substantially" beyond the tax
year had to be capitalized. 22 1 The Seventh Circuit based its holding
partly on its conclusion that the IRS's position in revenue rulings and
other cases evinced no consistent practice and that examples in the
applicable regulations favored the taxpayer. 222
The opinions in Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner223
illustrate many of the difficulties and issues discussed in this article.
The case involved recapture of investment tax credits under nowrepealed provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.224 The provisions
required recapture when a subsidiary that was part of a group filing a
consolidated tax return acquired property for which such investment
tax credits had been taken in an intercompany transfer and was then
transferred to a shareholder in a tax-free transaction. 225 An example
in the regulations applicable to affiliated corporations filing
consolidated returns stated that sale of the stock of the subsidiary a
year after transfer of the property was not a disposition triggering
recapture of the investment tax credit.226 IRS Revenue Ruling 82-20,
however, required recapture whenever the intercompany transfer of
the property was part of a planned transfer outside of the
consolidated group. 227 The revenue ruling did not discuss or
mention consolidated group regulations.
The Tax Court opinion,2 28 decided after Chevron but prior to
Mead, relied on the consolidated return regulations to find there had

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 1130-31.
270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1145.
347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 37 (2004).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177-78.

226. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3(f)(3) (1990).
227. Rev. Rul. 82-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6 (1982).
228. Trinova Corp. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 68 (1997), rev'd sub nom.
Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003).
Trinova was a fully reviewed decision, that is, a decision in which the entire
Tax Court participates rather than a decision by a single judge, pursuant to a
decision by the Chief Judge. See I.R.C. § 7460(a) (West 2003). The opinion
made no reference to Chevron.
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been no disposition requiring recapture even when, as in AeroquipVickers, the transfer was part of a plan to transfer the property
outside of the consolidated group. 229 The eleven judges in the
majority adhered to this position while acknowledging that it had
been rejected by two Courts of Appeals, both of which had looked to
the revenue ruling for guidance and found it neither unreasonable nor
inconsistent with prevailing law. 230 The Tax Court disagreed "with
both the result and the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals" and
concluded that "the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth
Circuits accorded the ruling undue weight and that revenue rulings
of the opinions of those Courts of
play a lesser role than the language
23 '
indicate."
to
Appeals seem
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reconsidered its position that
revenue rulings deserve Chevron deference. It concluded, in light of
the then-recent Mead decision, that revenue rulings merit only
Skidmore deference. 232 In reaching this conclusion, the court of
appeals emphasized that the IRS does not claim revenue rulings have
the force and effect of regulations. 233 Nonetheless, it also found that
by failing to acknowledge that some deference to revenue rulings is
proper, "the Tax Court mischaracterized the degree of deference
accorded to revenue rulings." 234 The Sixth Circuit decided that
consideration of various Skidmore factors, particularly the validity of
the IRS's reasoning, called for some deference to the applicable
revenue ruling. 235 It found significant the fact that the example in the
regulations assigned the asset transfer and the spin-off to different
years. 236 It also relied on the substantial deference owed to an
agency's longstanding interpretations of its own regulations.237
A lengthy dissent by Judge Clay agreed with the majority about
the importance of Mead and the application of Skidmore deference to
revenue rulings, but disagreed about the level of deference Skidmore
229. Trinova Corp., 108 T.C. at 76.
230. Id. at 75-76 (discussing Walt Disney Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 F.3d 735 (9th
Cir. 1993); Salomon, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1992)).
231. Trinova Corp., 108 T.C. at 76-77.
232. Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 181.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 182.
237. Id.
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entails. According to Judge Clay, Skidmore deference, as explicated
in Mead, is not automatic deference to interpretive authority because
deference under Skidmore requires "persuasive reasoning" by the
administrative agency. 238 The dissent disapproved of giving deference to the revenue ruling simply because the Commissioner had
drafted it and favored granting deference to the Tax Court because of
its expertise and lack of stake in the outcome. 239 The dissenting
opinion explained "to the extent this Court finds the Treasury
Department's rationale unpersuasive, we have no obligation to
defer. ' '240 The dissent found the revenue ruling inconsistent with the
and basic approach of the consolidated return
language, assumptions,
24 1
regulations.
These opinions demonstrate the difficulties in understanding the
meaning and role of Skidmore, particularly when a specialized court
hears cases. Unless given further direction by the Supreme Court,
lower courts will continue to disagree over whether Skidmore grants
administrative agencies a presumption of validity. It may be that an
administrative agency's task of persuading the court under Skidmore
differs little from that of any litigant-to claim respect according to
the persuasiveness of its position. 242 The modem reincarnation of
Skidmore may do no more than direct courts to consider various
factors that they might otherwise ignore. In other words, Skidmore
may simply be a limited deference consisting of a required judicial
checklist, a kind of outline for writing an opinion involving an

238. Id. at 186.
239. Following up on this suggestion, Aeroquip-Vickers filed a writ of
certiorari on the issue of what level of deference is owed to decisions of the
Tax Court, given its special expertise and its role as a court of national
jurisdiction. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 37 (2004). For a discussion of issues related to such
deference, see sources cited supra notes 150-155.
240. Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 186 (Clay, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 196.
242. As Colin S. Diver has observed in speculating about the meaning of
Skidmore, "[o]f course, the 'weight' assigned to any advocate's position is
presumably dependent upon the 'thoroughness evident in its consideration' and
the 'validity of its reasoning.' Deference in this sense is no more than
'courteous regard."' Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 565 (1985). He observes,
however, that "[c]ourts generally use 'deference' in an intermediate sense,
between 'courteous regard' and 'submission."' Id. at 565-66.
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administrative interpretation. 243 Another possible view of Skidmore
would be more generous to administrative agencies. This last interpretation of Skidmore would require courts to put a thumb on the
scale in favor of the administrative agency on the basis of assumed
experience and expertise.
Both under its earlier and current applications, Skidmore
fortifies the judicial voice.
As Professor Merrill explains,
historically under Skidmore, "[t]he default rule was one of independent judicial judgment. Deference to the agency interpretation
was appropriate only if a court could identify some factor or factors
that would supply an affirmative justification for giving special
weight to the agency views." 244 Today as well, courts ultimately
determine what the law is under Skidmore. Under Skidmore, a court
is free to adopt what it views as the better interpretation of the
statute. Although Skidmore's list of factors pays lip service to the
particular institutional strengths of administrative agencies,
particularly expertise, Skidmore ultimately requires agencies to
persuade courts on judicial terms through formality, consistency, and
reasoned deliberation. Notably, the list of considerations lacks
several factors of considerable importance to an administrative
agency, such as a particular interpretation's adminstrability or impact
on other statutory provisions for which the agency is responsible.
Unlike Step Two of Chevron, Skidmore deference fails to address the
policy-driven needs of administrative agencies. Mead has elevated
Skidmore to the same level of importance as Chevron and has
thereby diminished the authority afforded to administrative
interpretations.
VI. CONCLUSION

Mead vastly expands the judicial voice. It does nothing to limit
the reach of Chevron's Step One, the domain of the judicial voice,
while cutting back on Chevron's Step Two, the domain of the
administrative voice.
It also accords Skidmore, which asks
243. Cf Merrill & Hickman, supra note 168, at 855 (noting "Skidmore is
properly regarded as a deference doctrine because the court cannot ignore the
agency interpretation-the court must assess that interpretation against
multiple factors and determine what weight they should be given").
244. Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 972 (1992).
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administrative agencies to act like courts, an important role.
Almost a decade ago, I observed in piece written about Chevron
that judges, like all people, "act in their own interest to maximize
utility by increasing power or decreasing workload., 245 Deference to
administrative agencies decreases judicial workload, but it does so at
the expense of decreased power. The article predicted that "we will
see cycles in which a court will assert authority to interpret rules
until such interpretation imposes too great a burden on judicial
resources and then will announce a rule that husbands resources.
resources will decrease power, and the
Over time, the rule preserving
246
again."
begin
will
cycle
In part, the reduced deference to administrative agencies
reflected in Mead may well represent the current stage of such an
ongoing cycle. But I now also believe reduced deference reflects the
difficulty that judges have in hearing and understanding the
administrative voice.247 Judges understand best the endeavor and
approach in which they themselves engage.248 Like most of us,
judges are more comfortable with the familiar. Agencies will have to
do what courts ask of them-as for example, by providing detailed
explanations of how expert consideration leads to a change in a
longstanding interpretation. But agencies might also be well-advised
to include in the preambles to regulations their own concerns, such as
administrability or the impact of an interpretation on the statutory
scheme that are more salient to administrative agencies than to
judges. Administrative agencies need to amplify and translate their
uniquely administrative concerns so that the judicial voice can hear
245. Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: JudicialReview of Tax Regulations, 3
FLA. TAx REv. 51, 88 (1996).

246. Id. at 88, n.213; cf Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory

Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 149 (2001) (explaining cycles in terms of

self-defeating assumptions judges and legislators make about one another).
247. "Judicial review consistently ignores the external political and practical
factors that must lie at the heart of effective administrative action." Cross,
supra note 209, at 1039.
248. In the terminology of cognitive psychologists, judges, like all of us,
exhibit the "egocentrism bias," which is "an inability to take another's
perspective, which is tantamount to assuming that another's perspective is

precisely one's own...." Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and
Sometimes Misjudge-What Others Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to
Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 738 (1999), quoted in Seidenfeld Cognitive

Loafing, supra note 209, at 496.
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and understand them.
The uncertainties introduced by Mead
regarding the scope of Chevron's Step Two and its expansion of
Skidmore's role has heightened the need for such action by
administrative agencies. In the long run, or in particular cases, it
may be necessary for Congress to direct the courts to accept the
administrative voice as authoritative, perhaps by clarifying what is
required under the Administrative Procedure Act to survive arbitrary
and capricious review, or perhaps by clarifying what kinds of agency
actions qualify for Chevron deference.

